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Lamar Gardere1 Allison Plyer2 and Denice Ross3 
 
Data intermediaries have a symbiotic relationship with government as the source of most of their 
information. The open-data movement in government and development of software-as-a-service 
technologies shaped the data landscape after Katrina. Through relationships and talent transfers 
with The Data Center, the City of New Orleans went from having its chief technology officer in 
federal prison and its data systems in shambles to being a nationally recognized leader in open and 
accountable government. To be effective during disasters, an intermediary should be (1) in place 
and widely respected before the event, (2) ready to respond immediately after the event and for the 
long recovery, and (3) continually scanning the horizon for changes in data and technology. 
 
Data Capacity in New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina and the Levee 
Failures 
Before the storm, decisions, program design, and funding in the nonprofit sector typically were 
based on anecdotes and preconceptions. The Data Center (originally named the Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center) was founded in 1997 as a data intermediary. It had the dual goal 
of making statistics more relevant and accessible while building community willingness and the 
capacity to use numbers. To this end, we took a user-centered, demand-driven approach, starting 
with the statistics needed for grant writing and program design. We invested significant time 
attending meetings to find out what data the local nonprofit sector needed most. These 
observations, combined with interviews with nonprofit leaders, revealed that more than anything 
else, local nonprofits wanted basic demographic information about their neighborhoods to support 
grant writing and program planning. 
In 2002, we created a highly usable website with Census 2000 data compiled for all seventy-
three New Orleans neighborhoods. For each neighborhood, we published dozens of indicators, 
carefully curated and categorized to answer 80 percent of the questions that nonprofits had. This 
approach ensured that our audience did not have to plow through pages and pages of numbers to 
get to indicators of greatest interest. Surrounding the indicators were just-in-time explanations of 
what they represent and technical definitions of each indicator written in everyday language.  
We also included a short narrative about each neighborhood called a “Neighborhood 
Snapshot” that described each neighborhood’s distinctive features and history, with particular 
emphasis on the historic contributions of African Americans to each neighborhood. This emphasis  
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was chosen with the knowledge that New Orleans, for much of its history, had been majority  
African American, and that the contributions of African Americans are too often overlooked in 
official history books. In addition, we created content that addressed common questions about 
data. We wrote one article about how to use a proxy when the statistics you want are not available, 
and a series about how famous African Americans throughout history used statistics to advance 
social justice aims.1 These additional efforts were essential to ensuring that our audience would 
find the indicators on our website relevant and compelling.  
To ensure that the data would be accessible, we conducted extensive usability testing of the 
website.2 We knew from the literature that if our site was hard to use, the credibility of our content 
would be reduced.3 Usability testing is a formal method of watching users interact with a system 
to complete a task. We conducted this testing in users’ homes and offices, collecting and analyzing 
information about these real-world interactions to inform design improvements. Usability testing 
revealed specific ways to improve our categorization and labeling of indicators, as well as the 
location of links on the website.4 After these improvements were made, the website was officially 
launched. It became widely popular with local nonprofits and yielded an average of five thousand 
unique visits a month—about five times more traffic than a similar website serving the even larger 
and wonkier market of Washington, DC. 
While the website answered 80 percent of our audience’s questions, the other 20 percent of 
their questions could be answered by a technical assistance feature we called “Ask Allison.” To 
build trust, rather than generically labeling this feature “Technical Assistance,” we featured a 
staffer well-known in the community for data presentations and grant-writing trainings. Through 
this feature, requesters could submit any data-related question they had and get a response within 
one business day. With the aim of building self-efficacy to access and use statistics, we crafted 
each answer as a step-by-step set of instructions about how to navigate the Census Bureau (or 
other) website. We wrote the instructions in an intentionally friendly tone with references to 
current events in the city (e.g., “Happy Mardi Gras”) to ensure local credibility and a personal 
connection. We analyzed metrics created through the use of this feature to inform needed additions 
to the indicators on the website based on the most common requests. We received an average of 
one “Ask Allison” request every business day. 
In the years before Hurricane Katrina, the nonprofit and civic sector was starting to make 
strides in their level of data sophistication.5 For example, a spring 2005 internal evaluation of forty 
grant proposals to a local philanthropy indicated that 55 percent of applicants effectively used 
external metrics to make the case for their programming.6 But data-driven decision-making was 
still the exception. Nonetheless, before Katrina, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center 
had established a strong reputation as a credible, friendly, and reliable partner among New Orleans’ 
grassroots nonprofit and community leaders.  
In 2005, which predates the organized federal open-data movement codified by the federal 
Open Government Directive in 2009,7 the City of New Orleans provided very little data to the 
public beyond that available through onerous public records requests. These were the days of e-
gov, where costly front-end systems allowed users to look up one address at a time (for example, 
in the assessor or permitting databases) or to pay their property taxes online. Data-sharing between 
city departments or other government agencies (such as the Regional Planning Commission) 
tended to be ad hoc and quid pro quo. The city’s website domain was, appropriately, 
cityofNO.com.8 
It was easy to complain about the city’s data management, but two real challenges prevented 
the city from realizing the value of metrics to improve efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of 
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government services: civil service and procurement. Even in a fast-changing field like technology, 
civil service job descriptions had not been modernized in over a decade, and they included obsolete 
titles from the days of punch cards, such as “Lead Systems Programmer,” with obsolete pay to 
match. As a result, contractors made up nearly half of the city’s IT staff.9 Crucial functions, such 
as enterprise geographic information systems (GIS), were outsourced, meaning that when 
Hurricane Katrina came, the city had little institutional knowledge and was unprepared from a data 
perspective. Because of the condition of the city’s data management, The Data Center relied almost 
exclusively on federal statistics before the storm; but the rapid pace of change after Katrina made 
local metrics essential for paving the way for an informed and equitable recovery.  
 
After the Storm 
After the storm, federal statistics about New Orleans (including the Census 2000) became instantly 
obsolete. At the same time, old ways of making decisions—based on historical precedence, 
intuition, and personal relationships—no longer worked. The Data Center was inundated with 
requests from the media, nonprofits, businesses, national researchers, multiple federal agencies, 
community-based organizations, and federal, state, and local governments. Visits to the website 
went from 5,000 a month to 120,000 in the two months after Hurricane Katrina.  
Despite the demand, numerical facts were hard to come by. Three months after the storm, a 
researcher with the Brookings Institution was quoted in the New York Times saying it had been 
easier gathering data for Iraq than for New Orleans.10 At The Data Center, though our world had 
turned upside down, our user-centered approach meant that we knew where to start. What 
information do people need to accomplish what tasks? Our “Ask Allison” feature served as a 
funnel and a knowledge management system for the wave of increasing requests. Requests tripled 
from before Katrina and provided a treasure trove of evidence about the information people most 
needed. Population counts quickly emerged as the highest value data set. Neighborhood 
organizations needed information about which city blocks were at a tipping point of recovery so 
they could deploy their limited case management and volunteer rebuilding resources. Healthcare 
providers need to know where to place temporary and permanent clinics as neighborhoods slowly 
rebuilt. Funders needed to know which neighborhoods most needed childcare centers. Beyond the 
nonprofit sector, businesses needed to know neighborhood population density to consider opening 
or reopening stores. Federal, state, and local agencies needed population numbers to inform 
recovery efforts and continued program planning. Even evacuees needed facts on the repopulation 
of their neighborhoods to inform their own decisions to return.  
The Census Bureau was unable to provide this data because between decennial census counts 
it produces only one annual population estimate at the county level with a nine-month lag time. 
These estimates were neither timely enough nor granular enough to capture the rapid changes as 
residents rebuilt and the city recovered. The Data Center researched a large number of 
administrative data sets that might be a good indicator of repopulation and publicly available with 
a short lag time. These sets included data from school enrollment, traffic volume, utility accounts, 
drivers’ licenses, passenger car registrations, voter registration and participation, and United States 
Postal Service (USPS) National Change of Address records and residences actively receiving mail. 
USPS counts of active residences emerged as an indicator that best met criteria for a consistent 
relationship to population while being publicly available every month with only a two-week lag.11 
Although the numbers were publicly available, they were aggregated to ZIP codes and carrier 
routes. To measure recovery, The Data Center needed counts at a more granular level with 
consistent boundaries. We found that the direct marketing company Valassis had this information 
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at the address level. In a move that foreshadowed today’s movement to private-sector data 
philanthropy,12 where the public benefits from privately held data, The Data Center partnered with 
Valassis to get monthly updates of households actively receiving mail at the address level.13 
Additionally, technology was changing around us, as were the ways New Orleanians accessed 
information. Disruptive mapping technologies such as Open Street Map (launched in 2004) and 
Google Maps (2005) reduced barriers to producing interactive maps and fundamentally changed 
the user experience for navigating online maps.14 The field of crisis mapping soon popped up,15 
and The Data Center began to think more about purpose-built maps and apps with a short life span 
customized to the needs of different phases of the recovery. In this new context we used Google 
Maps to build the “Repopulation Mapper” that displayed the Valassis counts on households 
receiving mail aggregated to the block level. More important, we posted metadata (explanation of 
what the data is and what it is not) in plain sight and in everyday language. We conducted usability 
testing in the field with tasks that replicated the frequent questions this mapper was designed to 
address. Usability testing yielded tweaks to titles, the location of the legend, and changes to the 
map display so that it was viewable even on the low-resolution screens still dominant among our 
local users.16  
In addition to supplying high-demand information such as block-level repopulation, The Data 
Center found a pressing need to help community members, business investors, and policymakers 
at the local, state, and federal levels to better understand the pace of recovery. Katrina brought 
dramatic change and also flux for many years after the storm, which created chaos and confusion. 
Investors both public and private wondered about the strength of the economy and the housing 
market, the availability of needed infrastructure, and whether population was continuing to return 
to New Orleans. Rumors swirled about what happened to the billions of dollars of recovery funding 
allocated by Congress. Policymakers needed information about how to adapt and effectively 
deploy their resources. Operating under differing goals and priorities, decision makers found 
themselves in conflict with one another.17  
To address these issues, The Data Center had to shift from disseminating raw indicators to 
analysis. We formed a partnership with the Brookings Institution to identify and analyze indicators 
of recovery in four domains: population, housing, economy, and infrastructure. To ensure that end 
users could make use of the statistical trends, we created a report entitled “The New Orleans 
Index,” with graphics of each indicator and a one-page narrative summary of findings.18 The report 
was published monthly for the first two and a half years (when change was most rapid), then 
quarterly, then biannually, and finally annually by the fifth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina. With 
the aim of creating a common understanding of the trends to help inform decision makers as well 
as the general public to move in a common direction, we extended our reach beyond our website. 
We began using local and national TV, radio, and newspaper as new avenues for disseminating 
our findings. 
The New Orleans Index built on the reputations of The Data Center and Brookings for 
credibility, trust, and neutrality to develop a common understanding of the recovery that was expert 
(informed by Brookings’s expertise in trend analysis) and locally relevant (informed by The Data 
Center’s one-the-ground knowledge of post-Katrina New Orleans). In addition, The Data Center’s 
expertise in human-centered design ensured that the publications responded to changing needs and 
questions and that the publications were easy to understand and use.19 Through briefings and 
presentations, Brookings engaged federal stakeholders around the findings, while The Data Center 
engaged community groups and local officials. Media mentions averaged hundreds each year. An 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
 
5 
 
independent evaluation of this multi-year effort concluded that The New Orleans Index series of 
reports successfully: 
● Built a shared understanding and common operating picture among diverse stakeholders 
● Focused conversations on solutions and stopping debates about facts 
● Communicated to officials and investors outside New Orleans, reducing uncertainty and 
spurring investment 
● Helped decision makers identify needs and adapt priorities, policies, strategies, and programs 
● Spurred innovation20 
Another shift The Data Center had to make as the recovery progressed was to turn to the city 
for metrics on the recovery, since federal statistics were not timely enough or of sufficient 
geographic detail. The aforementioned data capacity challenges of the city became increasingly 
apparent. Months after the storm, Brookings alerted us that when they contacted the city’s 
Department of Safety and Permits for the latest cumulative count of building permits, sometimes 
the numbers were inexplicably half the previous month’s total. Years later we learned the cause: 
rather than adapting the existing permitting system to accommodate kiosk and online applications 
as demand for permits outpaced the ability of office staff to process them, IT contractors had built 
an entirely new permitting system (with a different data schema) to take in permits electronically. 
Thus, half of the permits were in-person using the pre-Katrina system and half used the new 
electronic interface. To compile a basic count of building permits issued post-Katrina, a city 
contractor had to combine these incompatible databases. This type of unnecessary complexity 
made any timely, meaningful analysis of city-held data nearly impossible and further entrenched 
the city’s dependence on its ballooning force of contractors. Some of these IT contracting 
relationships would eventually land both the chief technology officer and the mayor in prison.21 
With growing legal distractions among city leadership and increasingly pathological 
complexity in the city’s IT systems, the role of The Data Center became even more important in 
the years following the storm. Interestingly, other data intermediaries (such as The Data Center’s 
peers in the Urban Institute’s National Neighborhood Indicators Partnership) have since played 
similar roles during crises in city government, notably Data Driven Detroit during the city’s 
bankruptcy and Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance after the death of Freddie Gray in 
police custody. 22 When local government loses legitimacy, a trusted local data intermediary can 
help fill key gaps until local government gets back on its feet.  
 
The New Role of Data in New Orleans 
In the early days after the storm, data sharing was still largely bilateral between limited 
organizations, but an underground network emerged. For example, the city’s emergency operation 
center distributed its “Daily Dashboard” to a list of select partner entities and these entities 
forwarded it to other peers in the nonprofit sector. The same thing happened with other data sets, 
such as the Rapid Population Estimates survey results and geographic information on the city’s 
land ownership parcels.  
Government’s limited sharing resulted in a disparity of information access across 
neighborhoods. The Broadmoor neighborhood, which was inundated with high floodwaters, 
partnered with the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and was able to get special access to 
the city’s building permit data, which helped inform that neighborhood’s recovery.23 Knowing 
how valuable such records were for all neighborhoods’ recoveries, The Data Center maintained 
the drumbeat of equal access for all by obtaining and republishing data about the entire city, not 
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just neighborhoods with the capacity to create their own numbers or connections to get special 
access to information. President Barack Obama’s Open Government Directive came at a fortuitous 
time during the mayoral election, inspiring new possibilities of government transparency.  
When Mitch Landrieu was elected mayor in 2010, he formed the Tech Transition Team to 
look into the city’s data management and IT practices and make recommendations for his new 
administration. The Data Center’s co-director Denice Ross was invited to be part of the team, and 
Allen Square, also on the team, ended up becoming the city’s first chief information officer (CIO). 
As part of that work, the team reached out to some of the nation’s premier municipal CIOs and 
chief technology officers in Boston, Washington, DC, San Francisco, and Tampa. This infusion of 
ideas allowed the incoming administration to rapidly modernize and open up. The new CIO 
focused for the first year on the uncelebrated work of creating updated civil service job descriptions 
(with competitive salaries), stabilizing IT systems, repairing the department’s battered reputation, 
and modernizing procurement to accommodate new technologies, such as software-as-a-service 
that afforded more flexibility and agility and less risk. At the same time, the incoming CIO 
rediscovered the talent and experience already in place in City Hall. By listening to and 
empowering these seasoned voices in the city’s IT department, along with hard work, tenacity, and 
steady management, the team was able to rebuild an old and failing infrastructure while nurturing 
skills that would be needed to maintain healthy systems. Healthy municipal technology systems 
are critical to government’s ability to create, use, and share data for public benefit. With a renewed 
confidence and a fresh and determined focus on performance and innovation, the City of New 
Orleans began to attract the attention of the growing pool of tech talent developing in post-Katrina 
New Orleans. New Orleanians who had never before considered government service now found it 
a compelling career opportunity. The next CIO, Lamar Gardere, brought this effort to the next 
level with a citywide digital equity initiative, which included the active cultivation of high-
potential New Orleanians from populations who are typically underrepresented in technology. This 
infusion of newly empowered voices, novel thinking, and data talent, combined with high-level 
commitment to open government, transformed the city into a legitimate competitor for 
participation in national innovation networks such as IBM Smarter Cities Challenge, the Code for 
America Fellowship, Rockefeller’s 100 Resilient Cities, and Bloomberg’s iTeams and What 
Works Cities.  
Along the way, the city’s increasingly sophisticated approach to data allowed for the same 
shift to analysis that The Data Center made after Katrina. Performance management was the 
driving force behind much of the city’s data analysis. The city initiated public BlightStat24 
meetings (inspired by Baltimore mayor Martin O’Malley’s CitiStat),25 designed to bring together 
key staff and leaders from across city government to roll up their sleeves to meet Mayor Landrieu’s 
audacious goal of eliminating ten thousand blighted properties in four years. Data management 
was a key topic of conversation for the first two years of these meetings (started in 2010). Data 
from multiple departments, including code enforcement and the city attorney’s office, had to be 
compiled and verified to develop an accurate understanding of the status of each parcel. This 
initiative created an opportunity for the first compelling, easy-to-understand, use case for open 
data.  
In 2012, Code for America fellows collaborated with city residents and staff to create an online 
tool called “BlightStatus,” which—for the first time since the storm—gave residents, city staff, 
and leadership a single, shared view into the status of blighted properties.26 Removing the 
asymmetry of information allowed the conversation to shift from arguing about the facts to 
discussing what the solutions might be. The city met their goal a year early, and by 2014 had 
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reduced blight by thirteen thousand addresses.27 Of note, The Data Center was a symbiotic partner 
in the reduction of blight, having set the baseline with their 2008 report called “Benchmarks for 
Blight,” which took the innovative approach of using USPS records on addresses unable to receive 
mail (e.g., not active and not vacant) as a proxy for blight and then comparing that number across 
time and across cities.28 The city and the public came to rely on The Data Center’s independent 
analysis of progress against blight. 
The success of meeting the blight reduction goal was a proof of concept that allowed the 
benefits of open data to permeate throughout city government. City workers who had previously 
feared negative repercussions from releasing data found that opening up the data, even with all its 
flaws, generated increasing trust among stakeholders, created a mechanism for improving the data, 
and most important, fueled community partnerships for accelerating progress. As fear of making 
city data freely available subsided, one by one, city departments began opening their data to the 
public. In particular, the successful BlightStat initiative inspired the New Orleans Police 
Department to open their data, and once the police department was opening their data, it was hard 
for other departments to justify keeping their nonsensitive data in the dark.29  
As the city got more tech savvy and created more data tools, they were able to more quickly 
spin out high-demand data visualizations, such as damage-assessment maps of tornadoes that 
struck the city in 2017 or the traffic-and-flood tracking app released in August 2017 to help 
residents navigate frequent street floods (http://streetwise.nola.gov/).30 These tools and 
visualizations increased residents’ confidence in city data. A virtuous cycle was created where data 
tools with relevant use cases created more awareness of the city’s data and technology capacity. 
Potential data users shifted their approach from simply extracting city data and building their own 
tools to working in partnership with the city to build tools. This shift produced better results 
because the city could provide insights about internal business processes and how they affected 
the data and its interpretation, as well as point to additional city data that could be used in each 
partner's applications. For example, in 2016, after observing contractors in Detroit using 
proprietary methods to survey property conditions, the City of New Orleans’s IT team partnered 
with a local firm to cheaply collect property-condition data automatically with city-designed 
sensor rigs. With help from ESRI, an interface design process informed by community input, and 
New Orleanians willing to volunteer their time to score property conditions, the city effectively 
leveraged the concept of “civic tech” to crowdsource data collection on blight and property 
conditions.31 
Now, the City of New Orleans is recognized as a national leader in local government 
transparency, with more than two hundred data sets published and its work highlighted regularly 
in telling the story of how data can save lives.32 The City of New Orleans was invited to talk about 
their data work at the launch of President Obama’s Climate Data Initiative in 2014, and two years 
later, the city was on stage at the White House again talking about their leadership in the Police 
Data Initiative. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) was described as the “Queen of open 
data” in a 2015 FiveThirtyEight article, and the federal judge overseeing NOPD’s consent decree 
described the city’s new data capacity as “a miraculous transformation.”33 By 2016, Mayor 
Landrieu had signed the city’s first ever Open Data Policy designed to facilitate and routinize the 
release of freely available, public data in New Orleans.34 In 2018, the City of New Orleans became 
one of only thirteen cities nationwide to receive the prestigious What Works Cities Certification.35 
Today, outside of attention garnered around major Katrina anniversaries (which increase the 
audience two-fold), the audience for The Data Center is once again primarily local, with about 
eight thousand visits a month to the website. The presence of this data infrastructure continues to 
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give New Orleans a head start when changes come its way. For example, while other communities 
struggle to pull information together about Opportunity Zones for federal tax incentives, would-
be investors in New Orleans are easily pulling numbers on those neighborhoods from The Data 
Center’s website. Most important, those numbers are fortified with analysis from an equity 
perspective that increases the likelihood of their being used for good. People with financial 
resources and powerful social networks have always had access to the data they need to exploit 
neighborhoods; The Data Center levels the playing field so that agents for good also have access 
to that same information.  
 
Lessons Learned 
• Lead with the people and what information they need, not the technology. By starting 
with data the people needed and tying those data into a change process such as blight 
reduction, New Orleans created a narrative (the sky didn’t fall when data were released 
and good things happened) that inspired other domains, such as public safety, to follow 
suit. Often the best course is to keep the complex technology behind the scenes, using 
it to create simple, easy-to-digest information for the public in media formats they 
already consume, such as radio and morning news shows or a simple address lookup 
like the BlightStatus tool. 
1. Build data systems with not for stakeholders. Data needs to be not only technically credible 
but relevant and legitimate in the eyes of the community.36 The only way to ensure relevance 
and legitimacy is to get feedback early and often from community stakeholders. One rule of 
thumb The Data Center has is that if you have to conduct a training to teach someone how to 
use your website, you have not designed it well.  
• The value of the data intermediary lies not just in its staff but also in its role in 
developing talent who, through working relationships and career moves, can then 
transfer their knowledge to other organizations. Intermediaries also create data-savvy 
social networks within cities that span local government and the nonprofit and private 
sectors, connecting them to state and federal government.37 
• Don’t go it alone. New Orleans was able to accelerate its progress by partnering with 
respected national organizations such as Brookings, seeking out advice from municipal 
open-government leaders across the country, and participating in networks such as 
Bloomberg What Works Cities, Code for America, the National Neighborhood 
Indicators Partnership, and 100 Resilient Cities. A 2018 report by New America ranked 
New Orleans among the top 10 percent of networked metros.38  
2. A data intermediary is crucial civic data infrastructure for navigating shocks and stressors, 
whether it be a hurricane, crime, or the emergence of smart cities technologies. An 
intermediary can also spur private and public investments by reducing uncertainty after a 
shock. It may be that community data capacity before a disaster serves as an amplifier of social 
capital that is well-recognized as a key element of resilience.39 For example, Todd Richardson, 
who leads the research arm of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),40 
declared that he read The New Orleans Index every day after Hurricane Katrina to inform his 
decision making and that his highest recommendation for disaster-prone areas was that they 
replicate what The Data Center did for New Orleans.41 His doing so is particularly important 
because a great deal of federal disaster funding is distributed through HUD. After years of 
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advising communities who have undergone recent shocks, it has become clear to these authors 
that the time to build a data intermediary and build the necessary trust with the community is 
before disaster strikes.  
Just as the previous decade has seen the advent of ubiquitous mapping, software-as-a-service, 
and open government, the next ten years will see similar uncharted territory emerge in smart-cities 
technology, private-sector data, and particularly in the ethical use of algorithms and artificial 
intelligence in local decision-making. The Data Center is positioned to develop the talent and 
social networks needed to leverage these emerging technologies to further improve data 
availability and use in New Orleans. 
In addition, as The Data Center maintains its focus on the information needed most by 
residents of New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana, it is clear that our dissemination efforts must 
continue to track two existential threats to the region: disaster risk and increasing inequity. In the 
years since Hurricane Katrina, Southeast Louisiana has been struck by multiple hurricanes, 
including Ike, Gustav, and Isaac. In 2010 the massive BP oil spill damaged Southeast Louisiana’s 
wetlands that provide the region’s first line of defense against hurricane storm surge. And in recent 
years, frequent unprecedented rainstorms have flooded dozens of homes and businesses 
throughout the region.42 In addition, income inequality is growing more rapidly in New Orleans 
than the national average. Growing inequity not only negatively impacts economic growth and the 
provision of essential city services but hampers social cohesion and trust in government, which 
are critical to the resilience of a community faced with shocks.43  
A large share of the US population lives in areas at risk of natural disasters, such as 
earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, and tornados, or even manmade disasters, such as industrial 
contamination or terrorist attacks.44 Disasters compounded by inequity are growing nationwide; 
the challenges that New Orleans faces are not unique. Data intermediaries nationwide can play a 
critical role in disseminating statistics that help communities to be more resilient in the face of 
these current and future challenges.  
 
Notes 
1 Allison Plyer and Denice Ross, “You Can’t Always Get What You Want,” Greater New Orleans Community Data 
Center, August 2, 2005, http://www.datacenterresearch.org/pre-katrina/articles/corrdata.html; “Democratizing Data: 
Making Information a Tool of the People for the People,” Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, February 
21, 2003, http://www.datacenterresearch.org/pre-katrina/articles/democraticdata.html. 
2 “Usability Testing for Community Data Sites,” Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, accessed July 1, 
2019, http://www.datacenterresearch.org/pre-katrina/usability/. 
3 B. J. Fogg, Jonathan Marshall, Othman Laraki, Alex Osipovich, Chris Varma, Nicholas Fang, Jyoti Paul, Akshay 
Rangnekar, John Shon, Preeti Swani, and Marissa Treinen, “What Makes Web Sites Credible? A Report on a Large 
Quantitative Study,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 61–68 
(New York: ACM, 2001), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/365024.365037. 
4 “Usability Testing for Community Data Sites,” Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, accessed July 1, 
2019, http://www.datacenterresearch.org/pre-katrina/usability/. 
5 “What Will a Cut in U.S. Census Bureau Funding Mean for America's Cities? Investigating the Importance of 
Supporting Federal Information Programs for Urban America,” Brookings Institution, October 14, 2005. 
6 Jane Arsenault, “Part II: Analysis of United Way Proposals for Technical Assistance Needs,” July 2005, Nonprofit 
Knowledge Works archives. 
7 “Open Government Directive,” National Archives and Records Administration, December 8, 2009, accessed July 
1, 2019, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/open/documents/open-government-directive. 
8 Dave Walker, “Rachel Maddow Wants New Orleans to Just Say ‘Yes’ on Its Official Website,” nola.com, June 3, 
2010, https://www.nola.com/entertainment_life/movies_tv/article_6228919f-7471-56c5-a5bf-bb7861d1293d.html. 
 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
 
10 
 
 
9 “Transition New Orleans Tech Transition Team Report” (unpublished), April 29, 2010.  
10 Clifford J. Levy, “After Katrina, a Trickle of Returnees, New York Times, November 13, 2005, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/weekinreview/after-katrina-a-trickle-of-returnees.html. 
11 Allison Plyer, Joy Bonaguro, and Ken Hodges, “Using Administrative Data to Estimate Population Displacement 
and Resettlement following a Catastrophic U.S. Disaster,” Population and Environment 31, no. 1–3 (November 29, 
2009): 150–175, doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-009-0091-3. 
12 Brice McKeever, Solomon Greene, Graham MacDonald, Peter A. Tatian, and Deondre’ Jones, “Data 
Philanthropy: Unlocking the Power of Private Data for Public Good,” Urban Institute, July 24, 2018, 
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/data-philanthropy-unlocking-power-private-data-public-good. 
13 “Valassis Data Is at the Core of Community Rebuilding and Revitalization,” Valassis, June 4, 2018, 
https://www.valassis.com/about-us/newsroom/item/180604/valassis-data-is-at-the-core-of-community-rebuilding-
and-revitalization. 
14 Christopher C. Miller, “A Beast in the Field: The Google Maps Mashup as GIS/2,” Cartographica: The 
International Journal for Geographic Information and Geovisualization 41, no. 3 (October 10, 2006): 187–199, 
doi:10.3138/J0L0-5301-2262-N779. 
15 Sophia B. Liu and Leysia Palen, “The New Cartographers: Crisis Map Mashups and the Emergence of 
Neogeographic Practice,” Cartography and Geographic Information Science 37, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 69–90, 
doi:10.1559/152304010790588098. 
16 Denice Ross, “An App We Can Trust: Lessons from Katrina” (speech¸ Gov 2.0 Expo 2010, May 25, 2010). 
17 Melissa A. Schigoda, “The Use and Impact of Disaster Recovery Indicators from the Perspective of Complex 
Adaptive Systems Theory: The Case of the New Orleans Index” (PhD diss., Tulane University Law School, 2016). 
18 “The New Orleans Index,” Brookings, July 29, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-new-orleans-index/. 
19 Schigoda, Use and Impact of Disaster Recovery Indicators. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Gordon Russell, “In Tell-all Book, Greg Meffert Reveals How He, Ray Nagin Launched Side Deal at Outset,” 
New Orleans Advocate, August 28, 2009, https://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/article_2af4b36c-aa2c-
11e8-95e2-d361d8ff2723.html. 
22 Eric Burnstein, Eric, “Case Study: NNIP and Open Data in Detroit,” National Neighborhood Indicators 
Partnership, July 2014, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22801/413188-Case-Study-NNIP-and-
Open-Data-in-Detroit.PDF; Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance, “What Happened in Baltimore and What 
Can We Do? A Neighborhoods’ Perspective,” NNIP, January 7, 2016, 
https://www.neighborhoodindicators.org/library/catalog/what-happened-baltimore-and-what-can-we-do-
neighborhoods-perspective. 
23 The Broadmoor Project: Progress Report, Joint Project of the KSG/BCSIA Broadmoor Project and Bard College 
(Cambridge: Harvard University, March 2007). 
24 Ann Carpenter, Emily Mitchell, and Shelley Price, “Blight Remediation in the Southeast: Local Approaches to 
Design and Implementation (2015-11-01),” FRB Atlanta Community and Economic Development Discussion Paper 
No. 2015-5), available at SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2774636. 
25 Robert D. Behn, “The Varieties of CitiStat,” Public Administration Review 66, no. 3 (2006): 332–340, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3843915. 
26 Charles Chieppo, “New Orleans’ Winning Strategy in the War on Blight,” Governing, March 18, 2014, 
https://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-new-orleans-blightstat-vacant-dilapidated-property.html. 
27 Ibid.; William D. Eggers, “New Orleans’ Fight with Blight Started with Data,” Government Technology, October 
25, 2017, https://www.govtech.com/fs/data/New-Orleans-Fight-with-Blight-Started-with-Data.html. 
28 Allison Plyer and Elaine Ortiz, “Benchmarks for Blight: How Much Blight Does New Orleans Have?,” The Data 
Center, August 21, 2012, https://www.datacenterresearch.org/reports_analysis/benchmarks-for-blight/. 
29 Detroit noted a similar phenomenon, with police transparency inspiring other departments, such Code 
Enforcement and Public Works to follow suit. Building and Restoring Civic Capacity: The Obama Administration’s 
Federal-Local Partnership with Detroit (2011–2016) (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files/documents/DFWG_Report_Final_
120216.pdf. 
30 Dan Swenson, “Animated Map: A Closer Look at Tornado Devastation in New Orleans East,” nola.com, March 
11, 2017, https://www.nola.com/news/article_6da09a0f-4740-5109-ae98-a98a67ad5b51.html; 
Kevin Litten, “New Orleans Launches Website Promising to Track Real-Time Flooding, Accidents,” August 12, 
2017, https://www.nola.com/news/weather/article_576c4127-bf47-5d8d-9052-b6474657f4e1.html. 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
 
11 
 
 
31 “New Orleans Rapid Property Survey,” nola.gov, 2013, nola.gov/rapid-property-survey/ (accessed February 24, 
2020).  
32 Erin Cunningham, “The New Orleans Fire Department Calls on Data to Save Lives,” StateTech, August 6, 2018, 
https://statetechmagazine.com/article/2018/08/new-orleans-fire-department-calls-data-save-lives. 
33 Jeff Asher, “Which Cities Share the Most Crime Data?” FiveThirtyEight, December 28, 2015, 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/which-cities-share-the-most-crime-data/; Matt Sledge, “Federal Judge Praises 
NOPD's Push for More Open Data but Says More Progress Needed,” nola.com, November 17, 2016, 
https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/article_cc910789-4351-5ab9-9620-4aaba577b24b.html. 
34 City of New Orleans, “Mayor Landrieu Signs Executive Order to Make Data More Freely Available to Public,” 
press release, September 1, 2016, https://nola.gov/mayor/news/archive/2016/20160801-pr-mayor-signs-executive-
order-on-open-da/. 
35 “What Works Cities Certification,” What Works Cities, accessed July 1, 2019, 
https://whatworkscities.bloomberg.org/certification/. 
36 Tischa Muñoz-Erickson, Clark Miller, and Thaddeus Miller, “How Cities Think: Knowledge Co-Production for 
Urban Sustainability and Resilience,” Forests 8, no. 6 (2017): 203; Dave D White, Amber Wutich, Kelli L 
Larson, Patricia Gober, Timothy Lant, and Clea Senneville, “Credibility, Salience, and Legitimacy of Boundary 
Objects: Water Managers’ Assessments of a Simulation Model,” Science and Public Policy 37, no. 3 (2010): 219–
232. 
37 Allison Plyer has chaired the Census Bureau’s Scientific Advisory Committee since 2001. Denice Ross (2001–
2010) went from The Data Center to the Landrieu administration, where she launched the city’s open-data initiative, 
and then to the Obama White House, where she co-founded the Police Data Initiative. Joy Bonaguro (2002–2009) 
went on to become the first chief data officer (CDO) for the City of San Francisco and set the gold standard 
nationwide for the emerging role of the municipal CDO. Melissa Schigoda (2008–2012) wrote her dissertation on 
the New Orleans Index, transitioned to the National Network of Public Health Institutes, and now serves as director 
of the Office of Performance Management and Accountability at the City of New Orleans. Ben Horowitz (2011–
2014) moved on to create NOPD’s now nationally recognized data-driven approach. The talent flow has also gone 
the other way into The Data Center, with Robby Habans, who provided GIS support for the post-Katrina Rapid 
Population Estimate Survey collection now serving as The Data Center’s economist, and in 2017, Lamar Gardere 
moved from his role as the city’s second chief information officer to executive director of The Data Center.  
38 Tara McGuinness, Denice Ross, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Networks and American Renewal: Can Networks 
Supercharge American Ingenuity?,” New America, December 13, 2018, https://www.newamerica.org/national-
network/reports/networks-and-american-renewal/can-networks-supercharge-american-ingenuity/. 
39 Virginia Gil-Rivas and Ryan Kilmer, “Building Community Capacity and Fostering Disaster Resilience,” Journal 
of Clinical Psychology 72 (December 2016): 1318 –133; Fran H. Norris, Susan P. Stevens, Betty Pfefferbaum, 
Karen F. Wyche, and Rose L. Pfefferbaum, “Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities and 
Strategy for Disaster Readiness,” American Journal of Community Psychology 41 (2008): 127–150. 
40 “Todd M. Richardson,” US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and 
Research, accessed July 29, 2019, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/about/bio-Todd-M-Richardson.html. 
41 Roundtable discussion on disaster recovery metrics at the National Low-Income Housing Coalition on July 19, 
2018. 
42 “New Orleans Flooding Caused by Sudden Rain in What Might Be “a Taste of What Could Occur,” nola.com, 
July 10, 2019, https://www.nola.com/news/article_e7cd222a-a329-11e9-8b2d-ab8749f9d28a.html; Danny 
Monteverde, “Mother’s Day Flooding: Water in the Streets, but Not Like Summer 2017,” Eyewitness News, May 13, 
2019, https://www.wwltv.com/article/weather/severe-weather/mothers-day-flooding-water-in-the-streets-but-not-
like-summer-2017/289-2f09a915-6fb1-4792-bbe2-b0f87b7bf449. 
43 Edward L. Glaeser, Matt Resseger, and Kristina Tobio, “Inequality in Cities,” Journal of Regional Science 49, no. 
4 (2009): 615–646, http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/resseger/files/glaeserressegertobiojrs.pdf; Alan Berube, “All 
Cities Are Not Created Unequal,” Brookings Institution, February 20, 2014, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/02/cities-unequal-berube; Allison Plyer, Nihal Shrinath, and Vicki 
Mack, “The New Orleans Index at Ten,” The Data Center, July 31, 2015, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/gnocdc/reports/TheDataCenter_TheNewOrleansIndexatTen.pdf. 
44 Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 
2004), 
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/disaster/asia_pacific/Reducing%20Disaster%2
0risk%20a%20Challenge%20for%20development.pdf .  
